The ‘Dinner’ Raid
By Malcolm Scott DFC
A number of spectacular daylight strikes were carried out by the bombers of 2 Group during the war years and among the numerous operations undertaken by that Group’s Mitchells, probably the most important but certainly least publicised was the evening raid on 10 June 1944. It received no publicity at the time because the intelligence leading to the operation had been gathered at Bletchley Park, by ULTRA, the existence of which had to remain secret. As a cover, it was ‘leaked’ afterwards that the attack was based on information passed by the French Resistance and confirmed by aerial reconnaissance.
Panzer Group West – established by von Rundstedt in November 1943 – was a Command Post set up under General Geyr von Schweppenburg for the purpose of training and administering the seven Panzer Divisions in Northern France to be held in reserve for mass manoeuvre, when the Allied invasion came. This conflicted with Rommel’s plan to deploy the tanks forward and destroy the invading force on the beaches before any bridgehead could be established. Rommel appealed to Hitler, who compromised by giving him (via von Rundstedt) control of three Divisions, but reserving the other four to the orders of OKW – the German High Command. Von Schweppenburg shared the views of von Rundstedt as regards employing mass manoeuvre in a counter strike.
Rommel having deployed his available Panzers in an effort to stop the Allied advance, but to no avail, realised he must now make a co-ordinated counter-attack. Motoring to and from Panzer Group West on 9 June, Rommel was forcibly reminded of the enemy’s air superiority, having to abandon his car some 30 times to seek shelter from marauding Allied fighters. Having eventually reached von Schweppenburg’s HQ, Rommel ordered him to plan a decisive counter-attack. Panzer Group West became a hive of activity and the volume of radio traffic increased significantly.
These transmissions were picked up by the British Monitoring Section and HF/DF bearings located the source. The Headquarters of Panzer Group West were accommodated in Chateau de la Caine some 12 miles south-west of Caen: uncamaouflaged radio trucks, caravans, AFVs and other transit vehicles stood outside in the grounds of the orchard. Nearby, the village of Montigny where it was thought the NCO’s and other ranks were billeted.
Once the messages had been decoded by ULTRA at Bletchley Park and their importance realised, immediate advice was passed to SHAEF HQ. In the early hours of the next morning, orders were received by 2nd TAF HQ to carry out a strike with immediate effect on the Chateau de la Caine, with maximum effort. It was planned to use rocket-firing Typhoons attacking at low-level, with Mitchell’s bombing from medium height.
At Hurn airfield 124 Typhoon Wing, comprising 181, 182, 247 Squadrons, came to immediate readiness together with 245 Squadron of 121 Wings at nearby Holmsley South. At the same time, 139 Mitchell Wing, comprising 98, 180 and 320 Squadrons at Dunsfold, and 226 Squadron of 137 Wing; Hartford Bridge, were similarly alerted. Four Spitfire squadrons were placed on ‘stand-by’ for escort duties. Flight plans were drawn up and the aircraft armed. The Typhoons were loaded with eight 60lb rockets apiece, the Mitchell’s with the bomb load of 4,000 Ibs, made up of eight 500 pounds. Maximum effort had been called for – which meant ten aircraft from each of the Typhoon squadrons and 18 from each Mitchell squadron. When the time came, 40 fully-armed ‘Tiffies’ + two ‘spares’ were ready to take off, plus 53 Mitchell’s at Dunsfold, and 18 at Hartford Bridge were equally ready to take part in the operation.
The morning was heavily overcast with thick cloud stretching across the Channel and the briefing scheduled for 1030 was deferred. Later the cloud began to lessen and the aircrews were called in for briefing. As the weather conditions were still not ideal, the lead bomber of each squadron was to carry a ‘Gee-H’ operator in case cloud precluded visual bombing.
Meanwhile the Typhoons of 124 Wing carried out two operations against gun positions near Caen. 180 Squadron, headed by Wg Cdr Lynn, 139 Wing Commander Flying, was to lead the whole formation and 18 Mitchell’s in three catches of six aircraft became airborne at 2000. Within five minutes another 17 aircraft from 320, the Dutch Naval Squadron, were roaring down the runway, led by Cdr Burgerhout, and by 2010 Sqn Ldr Eager was leading 16 Mitchell’s of 98 Squadron in similar style into the air to join the two squadrons ahead of him.
The bombers climbed steadily, circling over base as they formed up, before setting course at 2022. Over Selsey Bill they were joined by another 18 aircraft of 226 Squadron led by their Commanding Officer, Wg Cdr Mitchell. Soon after, 33 Spitfires took up their escort positions, close escort being provided by Mark Vs from an ADGB squadron while three Mark IX squadrons of 84 Group flew high and low cover to the Mitchell’s. One 226 Squadron aircraft had to abort with mechanical trouble. Two others from 180 Squadron turned back before bombing; one with an oil pressure problem and the other with an instrument fault. Yet another suffered bomb release failure and brought its bombs back.
Two of the four Typhoon squadrons flew their ‘spare’ aircraft also, and of the 42 Typhoons taking part in the operation, two from each squadron were ‘fighters’ with no rockets but fully-loaded cannon, the remaining 34 were all rocket-firing ‘Tiffies’. The plan was for the Typhoons to attack in two waves with 30 minutes between them, the first wave’s attack on the parked vehicles and tanks to coincide with the assault by the bombers, the second wave’s task was “to clear up”.
That evening, in the large candelabra-lit dining room of the chateau, von Schweppenburg’s Chief of Staff, General von Dawans and his retinue of 18 staff officers were seated at the table enjoying their dinner when the air raid sirens gave imminent warning of the approaching attack. The table was hurriedly vacated as the officers rushed out to watch the proceedings. In service dress uniforms with their broad red-striped trousers, they must have been very obvious as they watched the Typhoons through binoculars wheeling into lines of attack, only realizing at the last moment that the Chateau and they were the target! It was reported that von Schweppenburg in his staff car, suitably emblazoned, swept into the ground just as the raid began. Seventeen Tiffies’ from 181 and 247 Squadrons loosed off 136 rockets from 2,000 feet with devastating effect.
Above at 12,000 feet, the three squadrons of 139 Wing spread in a ‘vie’, with the Mitchell’s of 226 Squadron flying tight up behind 180 Squadron in the No 4 position, converged on the target in boxes of six aircraft. At 2115 the Mitchell’s released 536 x 500 Ib bombs with great accuracy and saturated the chateau and the whole target area. Great clouds of dust and debris, flame and smoke rose into the air. Geyr von Schweppenburg and another officer were wounded, but von Dawans and the remainder of his staff perished in the attack.
Four ‘fighter’ Typhoons meanwhile swept into the nearby village of Montigny, shooting up the place with their cannon. As the Mitchell’s swung onto a north-westerly course after dropping their bombs, some Flak was experienced from Caen, but no real damage was suffered. By the time the second wave of RP Typhoons arrived on the scene, the chateau was a charred and smoking ruin and the radio trucks and other vehicles were shattered and scorched wrecks. The ‘Tiffies’ fired their rockets and cannon into any outbuildings that remained standing. All the bombers were down by 2225 (2025 GMT) and there was an immediate call for a ‘turn round’ for night operations. At de-briefing the elated aircrews of each squadron reported on the complete success of the operation. Almost everyone claimed they had seen their bombs fall on the target or close to it; Flak had been light, there was no enemy fighter opposition and the raid appeared to have taken the enemy defences completely by surprise.
With the whole planning staff wiped out and any plans for the Panzer counter-offensive that had been made now, quite literally, in ashes, it was a most serious setback for the Germans. Panzer Gruppe West had temporarily ceased to exist and SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Sepp Dietrich of the 1.SS Panzerkorps took command of the armoured divisions in the interim.
Es fielen am 10.6.44 fur Groosdeutchsland
die Kamaraden
FP Nr 13301
with a list of names. The bodies were later moved to the German military cemetery at La Cambe.
After Bletchley had decoded the signals emanating from von Rundstedt’s Headquarters of Armee Gruppe ‘B’ to OKW informing that Panzer Group West had been completely destroyed and would need to be re-established in Paris, the full significance of the results of this single co-ordinated strike became apparent. The appointment of new staff under General Eberbach and the preparation of plans for the armoured counter-stroke were delayed by some three weeks. The vital counter-attack never materialised as events overtook the situation, with the British 7th Armoured Division already ashore in full strength and heading south-east towards Caen.
From: 2nd Tactical Air Force Vol.1. Spartan to Normandy June 1943 to June 1944. – Shores / Thomas.
226 Squadron Operations Record Book
18 Mitchells of 226 Squadron, in company with 54 Mitchells of 139 Wing, were detailed to attack the Panzer Group H.Q. at La Caine. 17 aircraft attacked primary from 11-13,000 feet with 136 x 500 lbs MC nose inst. bombs. Bombs straddled the target causing immense volumes of smoke and fire. 2 of the boxes bombed visually whilst the second box bombed with the aid of special navigational equipment. 1 A/C A abandoned task owing to mechanical trouble and returned to base with bombs. Meagre inaccurate light flak was encountered from 3 miles west of target and moderate heavy flak from Caen a/f.
Damage assessment by the BAU (Zuckerman archive UEA)
The BAU (Bombing analysis unit) was established in September 1944 to investigate and report on the effect of allied bombing on aspects of the German war effort in north western Europe, Solly Zuckerman was its Scientific DirectorThe BAU (Bombing analysis unit) was established in September 1944 to investigate and report on the effect of allied bombing on aspects of the German war effort in north western Europe, Solly Zuckerman was its Scientific Director
SZ/BAU/41 Survey of the results of an air attack on HQ Fifth Panzer Army, La Caine July 1944, 1945
SURVEY OF THE RESULTS OF AN AIR ATTACK ON HQ FIFTH PANZER ARMY: LA CAINE – JUNE 1944.
SUMMARY
(i) On 10 June, 1944, Mitchells and Typhoons of the Second Tactical Air Force successfully attacked the Headquarters of the German Fifth Panzer Army at LA CAINE.
(ii) Bombs were very well distributed round the target, a density of 1 bomb per acre being achieved.
(iii) Several M.T. vehicles were destroyed by fragments. The available evidence confirmed the view that 500 lb. M.C. bombs functioning Nose Instantaneous are more effective for this purpose than are the same bombs functioning delay.
(iv) The attack was a great success and completely disorganised the headquarters.
OBJECT OF SURVEY.
1. At the request of H.Q. 2nd Tactical Air Force, a survey was made by the B.A.U. of the results achieved in a series of air attacks on localities believed to contain the Headquarters of German military formations, (B.A.U. Report No. 12). The attack on LA CAINE (Map Ref. T.9152 GSGS 4250 Sheet 7/F3) proved to be the most successful of all those investigated, and it was therefore decided to carry out a more detailed investigation to obtain some evidence as to :
(i) The general accuracy of attack
(ii) The material damage inflicted on the Germans.
THE TARGET.
2. The Chateau at La CAINE stands back from the main road at the centre of a small village. It has the usual outbuildings and is surrounded by trees. An orchard lies to the West of it.
3. Two days before the attack, a large formation of German troops arrived in the area, and the Chateau was taken over for the Headquarters. Two, and possibly three, generals were seen in the vicinity, and other officers were billeted in the village. The vehicles were parked in the orchards and under cover nearby.
4. It has been established from Prisoner of War information, from the names of German officers killed, and from other sources, that this was the Headquarters of the Panzer Group West, which later became known as the Fifth Panzer Army.
THE ATTACK.
5. The attack was carried out by Mitchells and Typhoons of the 2nd Tactical Air Force on 10 June, 1944. 61 Mitchells were over the target from 2119-2121 hrs. and they dropped 426 x 500 lb. M.C. bombs attacking from 11-13,000 ft. The bombs dropped were fused Nose Instantaneous (details of the particular pistol used are not at present available) but some of them functioned with a slight delay. The crews reported that the target was blanketed by bombs and that there were many hits in and around the village.
6. Between 2102 and 2155 hours, 40 Typhoons attacked in three waves. One wave of 10 aircraft attacked with 80 R.P: another, of 20 Typhoons, attacked with 128 R.P. or guns.
RESULTS.
7. Fig. 1 shows a detailed plot of all the bomb craters within a quarter of a mile of the Chateau. Craters at greater distances were not plotted owing to the fact that it was not possible to distinguish between bombs dropped during this attack and those dropped during subsequent attacks on other objectives in the vicinity.
8. The bombs dropped were fused Nose Instantaneous. Some, however, functioned with a delay. While only 130 craters were counted in the immediate vicinity of the Chateau, it seems some bombs detonated in the trees, since there were broken branches and fragment damage in the orchards in places fairly remote from craters. Owing, however, to the fact that 6 months had elapsed between the attack and the survey, it is not possible to be sure of this point. No rocket motors or other direct evidence of the R.P. attacks could be found.
9. Very little structural damage was found in the village, only three buildings being totally destroyed. There was, however, a large amount of blast damage to windows and roofs, and there were signs of considerable fragmentation in many areas. This type of damage is typical of 500 l.b. bombs fused Nose Inst. (B.A.U. Report No. 4). The Chateau itself had suffered little structurally. Although its windows and roofs were damaged and its walls heavily pitted by fragments (and possibly also by gunfire), it was certainly not rendered uninhabitable by the attack.
Casualties.
10. It is not known how many Germans were wounded, but it is certain that 18 of them including the Chief of Staff of the Panzer Group West, were killed. They were buried in a bomb crater in the orchard. The inscription on the grave indicates that the following officers were killed:
General Major Ritter und Edler von Dawans
Major i G Burgsthaler
Major i G von Waldow
Rittmeister Kuhl
SS Hstuf. Beck
Oblt. Fulig
Uffz. Ziedler
It has been established from Intelligence sources that the staff positions held in the Panzer Group West by some of the officers killed were as follows:
Gen. Maj von Dawans Chief of Staff
Maj. i G Burgsthaler Operations Officer
Maj. i G von Waldow I.D. (Operations Training)
Rittm. Kuhl Assistant Intelligence Officer
Damage to Vehicles.
11. The following vehicles were damaged beyond repair and were abandoned by the Germans:-
1 large mobile office
1 large mobile mess
1 large omnibus
1 Signals lorry
1 large staff car
2 small staff cars
All these vehicles had been either burnt out or looted. Photographs and details of the damage, as far as they are now obtainable, are given in Figs. 2 – 10. Nearly all the damage to the vehicles was caused by fragments from bombs fused Nose Inst. It is noteworthy that the small staff car illustrated in Fig. 8 had been knocked out by a bomb fused Nose Inst. and had suffered no damage from a bomb which had fallen much nearer to it but whose fuse had functioned after a delay.
Effect of the attack on the Germans.
12. The enemy left the Chateau immediately after the attack, and the command of the Panzer Group West seems to have been completely disorganised. This is indicated by the following extract from the telephone log of the German 7th Army Headquarters:
“0920 hrs. 11 June 1944. G-3 (presumably of 7th Army informs G-3 Army Group ‘B’ that … the Panzer Group West has been knocked out by a direct hit on its Headquarters. Command has been given to the First Panzer Corps.”It was learnt from a Prisoner of War who had been ordered to report to the headquarters of the Panzer Group West that when he arrived at La Caine for duty on 11 June, 1944, the Headquarters had departed. He also stated that shortly after this attack orders were received from the German High Command that in future no Headquarters were to be set up in Chateaux, and that they had to be established away from villages, and to have good cover from aerial observation. It seems probable that the La Caine attack was at least partly responsible for this order.
CONCLUSIONS:
14. Bombs were well distributed round the target, and a density of at least 1 bomb per acre was achieved.
15. 500 lb. M.C. bombs fused Nose Instantaneous are more effective in destroying soft skinned vehicles than are the same bombs when the fuse functions after a delay.
16. The attack was a great success and completely disorganised the Headquarters of the Panzer Group West.
